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Abstract
We study a large economy model in which individuals have private information
about their productive abilities and their preferences for public goods. A mecha-
nism design approach is used to characterize implementable tax and expenditure
policies. A robustness requirement in the sense of Bergemann and Morris (2005)
yields individual incentive compatibility constraints that are equivalent to those in
the theory of optimal income taxation in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971). Adding
a requirement of coalition-proofness yields a set of collective incentive conditions
which are akin those in the literature on public goods provision under private in-
formation on preferences, in the tradition of Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973).
Keywords: Optimal Taxation, Public goods provision, Revelation of Preferences,
Robust Mechanism Design.
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This paper provides a characterization of tax and expenditure policies that can be im-
plemented in a model in which tax revenues are used to cover the cost of public goods
provision and in which individuals have private information about their preferences for
public goods and about their productive abilities. It combines two diﬀerent strands of
the literature in public economics that traditionally have been separated: the theory
of optimal income taxation in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971), and the theory of public
goods provision under asymmetric information in the tradition of Clarke (1971) and
Groves (1973).
The theory of optimal income taxation is concerned with the characterization of a wel-
fare maximizing tax systems under the assumption that individual labor supply is not
exogenous but a function of the tax system itself. This literature mostly ignores public
expenditures and assumes that the government has an exogenously given revenue re-
quirement.1
The literature on public goods provision focusses on the characterization of a surplus
maximizing rule for the provision and ﬁnancing of public goods under the assumption
that individuals have private information on their preferences.2 This literature, how-
ever, disregards the production side of the economy and the tax system as an alternative
source of public goods ﬁnance.
A joint treatment of optimal taxation and preference revelation is diﬃcult for two rea-
sons. First, the combination of private information about productive abilities and of
private information about public goods preferences gives rise to a multi-dimensional
mechanism design problem.3 Second, the models that are used in the theory of optimal
taxation and the theory of public goods provision under asymmetric information are
very diﬀerent. While the former studies a large economy model in which each individ-
ual acts as a “price-taker” in the sense that the own behavior neither aﬀects aggregate
tax revenue nor public spending, the latter studies a ﬁnite economy in which each in-
dividual has a direct impact on the supply of public goods.
The contribution of this paper is to link these two diﬀerent strands of the literatures. It
is based on a large economy model with endogenous production, as is the theory of op-
timal taxation. The analysis of admissible tax and expenditure policies is complicated
by the fact that the social beneﬁt from public goods provision is a priori unknown.
This implies that the policy maker needs to acquire information on the distribution of
1The papers that include public goods assume that the social beneﬁt from public goods provision
is common knowledge, so that the problem of preference elicitation is moot; see, Boadway and Keen
(1993), Gahvari (2006), Kaplow (2006) or Hellwig (2004).
2Early contributions ask whether eﬃciency is possible given private information on preferences,
Green and Laﬀont (1977) or d’Aspremont and G´ erard-Varet (1979). The more recent literature includes
participation constraints, Mailath and Postlewaite (1990), Hellwig (2003) or Neeman (2004).
3The literature refers to such problems also as multi-dimensional screening problems; see Rochet
and Chon´ e (1998) and Armstrong and Rochet (1999) for a theoretical treatment and Cremer et al.
(2001) and Beaudry et al. (2008) for applications to the theory of optimal taxation.
1preferences; e.g., he needs to learn whether many or only few individuals have a high
valuation of a public good.
However, this problem of preference elicitation may be considered trivial. In a large
economy, a single individual’s valuation has no inﬂuence on the social beneﬁt from
public goods provision, so that a single individual’s communication of public goods
preferences does not aﬀect the supply of public goods. But if no individual can inﬂu-
ence public goods provision anyway, then individuals may as well the truth. According
to this view, preference elicitation is a trivial problem in a large economy.
With an appeal to real-world political decision making, this conclusion seems to be
overly optimistic. If one thinks about the role of political parties and special inter-
est groups, the assumption that individuals with common interests may try to induce
policies that are favorable to them seems more plausible than the alternative view that
the problem of preference revelation is trivial provided that the number of individuals
is suﬃciently large. To articulate this concern in a model of optimal income taxation,
this paper relies on the solution concept of a coalition-proof equilibrium. It is based
on the assumption that like-minded individuals can coordinate their communication
of public goods preferences. If a suﬃciently large number of individuals departs from
truth-telling, the policy maker will end up with a wrong perception of the social ben-
eﬁts from public goods provision and the supply of public goods will be manipulated.
A coalition-proof equilibrium requires that there is no group of individuals who can
beneﬁt from such a joint lie about their public goods preferences.
The main result of the paper is to provide a characterization of tax and expenditure
policies that are implementable as a coalition-proof equilibrium and that are robust in
the sense of Bergemann and Morris (2005), i.e., whose implementability does not re-
quire speciﬁc assumptions on individuals’ probabilistic beliefs about the characteristics
of other individuals. In particular, we will provide conditions such that the imple-
mentability of a policy rule can be reduced to the following two conditions. First,
individuals do not beneﬁt from a false declaration of productive abilities. These con-
straints are equivalent to those in the theory of optimal income taxation developed by
Mirrlees (1971). Second, groups of individuals do not beneﬁt from a joint lie about
their public goods preferences. This latter requirement gives rise to inequality con-
straints which are mathematically equivalent to those in Clarke (1971) and Groves
(1973). Here, however, they have a political economy interpretation because they refer
to the possibility of manipulative collective actions.
In the remainder of the introduction, I provide a sketch of the formal arguments.
There is a large number of individuals. Each individual consumes a public and a pri-
vate good and supplies labor. Utility functions are assumed to be additively separable.
An individual’s valuation of the public good is increasing in a taste parameter, and an
individual’s disutility of labor supply is decreasing in a productivity parameter. There
is a ﬁnite set of possible taste parameters and a ﬁnite set of possible productivity levels.
Individuals have private information on their productivity and their taste parameter.
2At an aggregate level, there is no uncertainty about the cross-section distribution of
abilities; e.g., if there are three possible productivity levels, this means that the pop-
ulation shares of high-skilled, medium-skilled and low-skilled individuals are common
knowledge. By contrast, there is uncertainty about the joint distribution of taste pa-
rameters and skill levels. Formally, there is a random state of the economy which spec-
iﬁes, for each skill level, a distribution of taste parameters. For instance, with three
possible productivity levels and two possible taste parameters a state of the economy
lists the fraction of low-skilled individuals with a high taste parameter, the fraction of
medium-skilled individuals with a high taste parameter and the fraction of high-skilled
individuals with a high taste parameter.
The analysis is based on a mechanism design approach. A mechanism is used to im-
plement a social choice function which consists of a provision rule for public goods and
an allocation rule for private goods. The provision rule speciﬁes, for each state of the
economy, how much of a public good is provided. The private goods allocation rule
speciﬁes a consumption level and an output requirement for individuals as a function
of their productivity level, their taste parameter, and the state of the economy.
The set of implementable social choice functions typically depends on the equilibrium
concept that is used. A widely-used one is Bayes-Nash equilibrium which is based on the
assumption that there is a common prior probability distribution over individual char-
acteristics and that an individual’s beliefs are obtained by conditioning this common
prior on the individual’s private information. Given these beliefs, individual actions are
required to be maximizing expected utility. A problem with this solution concept is its
dependence on the speciﬁcation of individual beliefs. The set of implementable social
choice functions varies with the common prior that is put into the model. Given that
such assumptions about individual beliefs are diﬃcult to defend, the resulting notion of
implementability is problematic. To avoid these issues, we will use a notion of robust
implementability that has been introduced by Bergemann and Morris (2005).
In a companion paper, Bierbrauer (2008b), we have shown that robust implementabil-
ity as a Nash equilibrium gives rise to incentive compatibility constraints that are
equivalent to those in the theory of optimal income taxation.4 This paper adds the
requirement that these Nash-equilibria are coalition-proof and derives an additional set
of constraints, referred to as collective incentive compatibility constraints.
Coalition formation is modelled as follows. Individuals may jointly manipulate their
announcements to a mechanism designer. We follow Laﬀont and Martimort (1997,
2000) in that we assume that these individuals face an own mechanism design prob-
lem.5 Hence, a manipulation mechanism must satisfy incentive compatibility con-
straints which ensure that deviating individuals reveal their characteristics truthfully
4In particular, consumption levels and output requirements are only a function of productive abil-
ities; i.e., individuals who diﬀer only in their public goods preferences receive the same consumption
level and have to provide the same output. Incentive compatibility holds if and only if individuals
prefer their own consumption-output bundle over the ones of individuals with diﬀerent ability levels.
5Laﬀont and Martimort (1997, 2000) study a model with two agents who might engage in collusion.
This paper extends their approach to an economy with a continuum of individuals.
3to a ﬁctitious coalition organizer and participation constraints which ensure that the
deviating individuals do indeed beneﬁt from the manipulation. A social choice function
is said to be collectively incentive compatible if it leaves no scope for such collective
manipulation mechanisms.6
It is shown that the collective incentive compatibility constraints only need to address
the communication of public goods preferences. Since the cross-section distribution of
abilities is commonly known, the policy maker can prevent individuals from a false col-
lective communication of productive abilities by making the outcome that is induced
by such a joint deviation suﬃciently unattractive. By contrast, the distribution of
preferences is not known and the provision of incentives for a collective revelation of
preferences is therefore not trivial.
The ﬁnal part of the paper analyzes collective incentive compatibility under the assump-
tion that the state of the economy is observable but not veriﬁable. In the literature,
such environments are also known as complete information environments. We show
show that collective incentive compatibility in all complete information environments
is weaker than robust collective incentive compatibility which requires that there is
no scope for collective manipulations whatever the probabilistic beliefs of individuals
about the state of the economy are.7 Robust collective incentive compatibility is a
very restrictive concept. For instance, joint manipulations by individuals who oppose
public goods provision and by individuals who beneﬁt from public goods provision can
restrict the set of implementable social choice functions. However, such manipulations
are themselves not robust with respect to the speciﬁcation of beliefs; e.g., if we change
the probability distribution over the possible states of the economy in such a way that
a manipulation mechanism becomes more attractive for those who want a public good
to be provided, we reach a point where those who are harmed by the provision of the
public good are no longer willing to participate. The focus on complete information
environments excludes manipulations which are viable only with speciﬁc beliefs and
implies that aligned preferences are the only rationale for joint manipulations of indi-
viduals.
Given the focus on complete information environments, we study the possibility to
“aggregate” collective incentive compatibility conditions. In particular, we provide
conditions such that the collective incentive constraints which exclude manipulations
by individuals who have the same productivity level (but possibly diﬀerent public goods
preferences) can be analyzed as if their was a ﬁctitious “representative agent” who is
aﬀected by the income tax system in exactly the same way as these individuals and
who announces his own public goods preferences. With this characterization we can
show that the collective incentive compatibility conditions are very similar to the in-
6The requirement that the organization of a manipulation must be internally incentive compatible
distinguishes the approach of Laﬀont and Martimort (1997, 2000) from those of alternative authors.
For instance, Olszewski (2004) assumes that a group manipulation is possible as soon as all individuals
in the group are willing to participate.
7By contrast, if coalition-proofness is not imposed, these two notions are equivalent, see Ledyard
(1978) and Bergemann and Morris (2005).
4centive constraints in the literature on public goods provision in the tradition of Clarke
(1971) and Groves (1973). In particular, we provide conditions under which a Groves
mechanism implements a surplus maximizing public goods provision level as a domi-
nant strategy equilibrium in a revelation game that is played by a set of representative
agents, one for each possible productivity level.
The general insight from the literature on public goods is that contributions to the
cost of public goods provision have to be calibrated to preference intensities to ensure
that individuals reveal their preferences. A similar result is obtained in this paper.
The collective incentive compatibility constraints imply that two principles have to be
satisﬁed: The ﬁrst one is “no taxation without representation”: If some representative
agent has only a small impact on the supply of public goods under the preference rev-
elation mechanism, then his income tax payments must be independent of the supply
of public goods. Otherwise he will understate his public goods preference to minimize
his contribution to the cost of public goods provision. The second principle is “no
representation without taxation”: If the income tax payments of some representative
agent do not increase in the supply of public goods, then it is not possible to grant
him any inﬂuence on public good provision. Otherwise he would exaggerate his public
goods preferences so that he can free-ride on the tax payments of others.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 speciﬁes the model
and contains a characterization of robust incentive compatibility. In Section 3, we
introduce the notion of a coalition-proof equilibrium and characterize implementable
social choice functions. This leads to collective incentive compatibility conditions. Sec-
tion 4 studies implications of collective incentive compatibility constraints for complete
information environments. The last section contains concluding remarks. All proofs
are in the Appendix.
2 Model
2.1 The environment
There is a continuum of individuals. Individual i’s preferences are represented by the
utility function
U(q,c,y,wi,θi) = v(q,θi) + u(c,y,wi),
where q is the amount of a public good, c is the consumption of a private good, and
y denotes an individual’s eﬀective labour supply, or, contribution to the economy’s
output. The function u is increasing in c, decreasing in y and strictly quasiconcave.
The function v gives the utility due to public good provision. For a given θi, v is twice
continuously diﬀerentiable with vq > 0 and vqq ≤ 0.
θi is a taste parameter that aﬀects individual i’s valuation of the public good. We
assume that there is a ﬁnite ordered set of possible taste parameters Θ = {θ1,...,θm}
5and that the marginal utility vq from public good provision is increasing in the taste
parameter, vq(q,θl) < vq(q,θl+1). Hence, individuals with a larger taste parameter
beneﬁt more from increased public good provision.
wi is a skill or productivity parameter that aﬀects individual i’s disutility of contributing
to the economy’s output. There is a ﬁnite ordered set of possible skill levels W =
{w1,...,wn}. Indiﬀerence curves in a y−c-diagram satisfy the single crossing property,








Less productive individuals need to exert more eﬀort to produce a given output and
hence need more compensation for an increased output requirement.
Individuals are privately informed about their taste parameter and about their skill
level. At an aggregate level there is no uncertainty about the cross-section distribution
of skill parameters. By contrast, the cross-section distribution of public goods pref-
erences is taken to be a random quantity. More speciﬁcally, we impose the following
assumptions.
First, there is a commonly known cross-section distribution f = (f1,...,fn) of skill
levels, where fk denotes the fraction of individuals with wi = wk.8 This assumption is
typically made in the literature on optimal income taxation in the tradition of Mirrlees
(1971). It will prove convenient for our purposes because it implies that the economy’s
resource constraint is not subject to aggregate uncertainty.
Second, the joint cross-section distribution of skill levels and taste parameters is taken
to be the realization of a random variable which takes values in a set S. A typical
element s ∈ S is referred to as a state of the economy and written as s = (s1,...,sn),
where sk = (sk1,...,skm) is the distribution of taste parameters among individuals
with skill level wk, i.e., skl is the fraction of individuals with θi = θl among those with
wi = wk. We write Sk for the set of possible distributions of taste parameters among
individuals with skill level Sk.
The desirability of public good provision will typically depend on the state s. Consider
two states s and s′ such that, for each k, s′
k ﬁrst order stochastically dominates sk.
Hence, in state s′ more individuals have a high valuation of the public good than in
state s so that a welfare maximizing policy rule will be such that in state s′ more of
the public good is provided than in stats s.
A social choice function formalizes the dependence of outcomes on the state of the
economy. It consists of a provision rule for the public good q : s  → q(s) that speci-
ﬁes for each state s how much of the public good is provided, and a pair of functions
c : (s,w,θ)  → c(s,w,θ) and y : (s,w,θ)  → y(s,w,θ), which determine for each state,
8Upon invoking a law of large numbers for large economies we can interpret fk both as the ex ante
probability that any given individual has skill parameter wk, and as the population share of individuals
with this skill parameter. For details see Al-Najjar (2004), or Judd (1985a).
6each skill level, and each taste parameter a consumption level and an output require-






(y(s,wk,θl) − c(s,wk,θl))skl ≥ r(q(s)) , (1)
where r is an increasing and convex cost function which captures the resource require-
ment of public good provision.
This speciﬁcation restricts attention to social choice functions that are anonymous in
the following sense: for a given state s, two individuals who have the same taste pa-
rameter and the same skill level receive the same private goods consumption and have
the same output requirement. Also, a permutation of individual characteristics which
leaves the joint cross-section distribution of public goods preferences and skill levels un-
aﬀected does neither aﬀect the decision on public goods provision nor, for given (w,θ),
the corresponding consumption level and output requirement.9
2.2 Robust Mechanism Design
We seek to characterize social choice functions can be made the equilibrium allocation
of a game of incomplete information in which individuals have information about their
own characteristics but lack information about the characteristics of others and about
the state s of the economy. Moreover, in order to avoid speciﬁc assumptions about
individual beliefs,we will use the notion of robust implementability that has been intro-
duced by Bergemann and Morris (2005). Following their approach, we will ﬁrst deﬁne
what it means to implement a social choice function for a given speciﬁcation of beliefs
and then characterize the social choice functions that are robustly implementable, i.e.,
that can be implemented whatever those beliefs are.
An individual is henceforth characterized by a preference parameter, a productivity
level, beliefs about the distribution of these characteristics in the economy and beliefs
about the beliefs of other individuals. Following Bergemann and Morris (2005) we
summarize these data in a type space T := [T,w,θ,π], where T is the set of “abstract”
types, w : t  → w(t) is a mapping that speciﬁes the skill level of an individual with type
t. Likewise, the mapping θ : t  → θ(t) gives type t’s taste parameter. For brevity, we
refer to the pair (w(t),θ(t)) as the payoﬀ type of type t. The function π : t  → π(t)
speciﬁes the beliefs of an individual of type t with respect to the cross-section distri-
bution of types. Let φ be a typical element of the set of probability distributions on
T, ∆T, and φ(T ) be the cross-section distribution of types associated with type space
T , then π(t)[X] is the probability that a type t individual assigns to the event “φ(T )
belongs to a subset X of ∆T”.
The beliefs π determine both an individuals beliefs about the payoﬀ types of other
individuals and about the beliefs of other individuals. To illustrate this let φ1 be the
9Guesnerie (1995) refers to these properties as recipient anonymity and anonymity in inﬂuence,
respectively.
7marginal cross-sections distribution of payoﬀ types that is associated with a given cross
section distribution of types φ and let ∆W×Θ be the set of probability distributions
over W × Θ. The probability that a type t individual assigns to the event “φ1 belongs
to a subset Y of ∆W×Θ” is given by
R
{φ∈∆T|φ1∈Y } dπ(t). In a similar way, we can derive
a type t individual’s beliefs about the beliefs of other individuals from π(t).
A given type space T is associated with a joint cross-section distribution of taste pa-
rameters and skill levels that we denote by s(T ). In particular, two type spaces T and
T ′ may give rise to the same cross-section distribution of payoﬀ types, s(T ) = s(T ′),
but diﬀer in the speciﬁcation of individual beliefs so that φ(T )  = φ(T ′).
Given the restriction to anonymous social choice functions, we limit attention to so-
cial choice functions that can be implemented by means of an anonymous allocation
mechanism, i.e., a mechanism whose outcome is left unaﬀected by a permutation of
individual actions.10 Formally, an anonymous allocation mechanism M = (A,Q,C,Y )
speciﬁes an action set A and a collection of functions, where Q : α  → Q(α) gives the
level of public good provision as a function of the cross-section distribution of actions α,
and the functions C : (α,a)  → C(α,a) and Y : (α,a)  → Y (α,a) specify a consumption
level and an output requirement as a function of an individual’s message a and of the
distribution of messages α.
A strategy in the game induced by M is a function σ : T → A that speciﬁes an action
for each type of individual. We denote by α(φ,σ) the cross-section distribution of ac-
tions that is induced by σ if the cross-section distribution of types is φ.
Given an allocation mechanism M and a type space T , we say that the strategy
σ∗ : T → A is an interim Nash equilibrium if, for all t ∈ T, and all a ∈ A,
Z
∆T




˜ U(α(φ(T ),σ∗),a,w(t),θ(t)) dπ(t),
where
˜ U(α(φ(T ),σ∗),a,w(t),θ(t))
:= U(Q((α(φ(T ),σ∗)),C(α(φ(T ),σ∗),a),Y (α(φ(T ),σ∗),a),w(t),θ(t))
is a shorthand notation for the utility that a type t individual realizes under mechanism
M from choosing action a given that all other individuals follow strategy σ∗ and the
cross-section distribution of types equals φ(T ).
The large economy speciﬁcation implies that the action chosen by a single individual
can not aﬀect the cross-section distribution of actions. This explains why, in the above
equilibrium condition, the term φ(T ) appears both on the left-hand side and on the
right-hand side.
A social choice function (q,c,y) is said to be implementable on a type space T , if there
is some mechanism M such that the equilibrium allocation of the mechanism is equal
10For a more extensive discussion of anonymous games, see Kalai (2004).
8to the outcome that is stipulated by the social choice function for this type space.
Formally, the mechanism M is said to implement the social choice function (q,c,y) on
type space T , if σ∗ : T → A is an in interim Nash equilibrium strategy for the game
induced by M on type space T , and moreover
Q(α(φ(T ),σ∗)) = q(s(T )) (2)
and, for all t,
C(α(φ(T ),σ∗),σ∗(t)) = c(s(T ),w(t),θ(t)) (3)
and
Y (α(φ(T ),σ∗),σ∗(t)) = y(s(T ),w(t),θ(t)) . (4)
A social choice function is said to be robustly implementable if there is a mechanism M
and a strategy σ∗ such that (i) σ∗ : T → A is an interim Nash equilibrium strategy for
the game induced by M on every type space, and (ii) conditions (2)-(4) hold on every
type space.
This notion of robust implementability diﬀers slightly from the one used by Bergemann
and Morris (2005), who allow the mechanism that implements the social choice function
to depend on the type space, i.e., a social choice function is robustly implementable
in the sense of Bergemann and Morris (2005) if, for every type space T , there is a
mechanism M(T ) that implements the social choice function on this type space.
We prefer a notion of robustness that diﬀers from the one due to Bergemann and Morris
(2005) because the mechanism designer and also the individuals do not know the type
space. The mechanism designer’s problem is to learn what the type space is. Hence, he
can not rely on a mechanism that presupposes that the type space is known. Also, it
seems natural to assume that individuals follow the same strategy on every type space.
Given that individuals know their types but not the type space, the action that they
choose can depend on the former but not on the latter.11
The following Proposition provides a characterization of robustly implementable social
choice functions.
Proposition 1 A social choice function (q,c,y) is robustly implementable if and only
if it satisﬁes the following individual incentive compatibility constraints: For every
s ∈ S and every (w,θ) ∈ W × Θ,
U(q(s),c(s,w,θ),y(s,w,θ),w,θ) ≥ U(q(s),c(s, ˆ w, ˆ θ),y(s, ˆ w, ˆ θ),w,θ), (5)
for every (ˆ w, ˆ θ) ∈ W × Θ.
11With the solution concept of an interim Nash equilibrium, this distinction is not essential. Both
versions of robust implementability give rise to the same constraints on the set of social choice functions.
However, in the next section where the requirement of coalition-proofness is added it makes a diﬀerence
which notion of robustness is employed.
9The proof of Proposition 1 is in the Appendix. To get an intuitive understanding, note
ﬁrst that the Revelation Principle implies that robust implementability can be equiv-
alently deﬁned as follows: a direct mechanism, implements a social choice function in
a truthful equilibrium on every type space. Second, individual incentive compatibility,
as deﬁned by (5), is equivalent to implementability on a speciﬁc class of types spaces,
namely those where the beliefs of all individuals assign probability 1 to the event that
the cross-section distribution of preferences equals s. We refer to such types spaces in
the following also as complete information type spaces.
The main step in the proof is to show that implementability on each complete infor-
mation type space implies implementability on each type space. This follows since the
payoﬀ from truth-telling on an arbitrary type space is a convex combination of the
payoﬀs from truth-telling on the set of complete information type spaces. Trivially, if
truth-telling is a best response on each complete information type space, then it is also
a best response “on average”.
2.3 Implications of individual incentive compatibility
Given Proposition 1, we limit attention to individually incentive compatible social
choice functions. Using that the utility function U is additively separable, the incentive
compatibility constraints in (5) can be equivalently written as follows. For every s ∈ S
and every (w,θ) ∈ W × Θ,
u(c(s,w,θ),y(s,w,θ),w) ≥ u(c(s, ˆ w, ˆ θ),y(s, ˆ w, ˆ θ),w), (6)
for all ( ˆ w, ˆ θ).
Since the economy is large, the supply of the public good is unaﬀected by a single
individual’s behavior. This explains why the public good does not enter the individual
incentive compatibility constraints.
It is easily veriﬁed that the inequalities in (6) imply that, for every s, for every given
w and every pair θ and θ′,
u(c(s,w,θ),y(s,w,θ),w) = u(c(s,w,θ′),y(s,w,θ′),w). (7)
This equation says that two individuals who diﬀer only in their taste parameter, derive
the same utility from their respective (c,y) combination, in every state s. Since two
individuals who diﬀer only in their taste parameter have the same ranking of alternative
(c,y) bundles, it is impossible to discriminate between them.
Given condition (7), it is without loss of generality to assume that also c(s,w,θ) =
c(s,w,θ′) and y(s,w,θ) = y(s,w,θ′), for every s, w, and every pair (θ,θ′).12 With some
abuse of notation, we denote the consumption level of individuals with skill parameter
w in state s by c(s,w) and the corresponding output requirement by y(s,w). We can
12Any welfare-maximizing social choice function is such that individual utility levels are generated at
a minimal resource cost. Hence it must be true that y(s,w,θ)−c(s,w,θ) = y(s,w,θ
′)−c(s,w,θ
′). This
equality in conjunction with the fact that indiﬀerence curves in a y − c diagram are strictly increasing
and strictly convex, yields c(s,w,θ) = c(s,w,θ
′) and y(s,w,θ) = y(s,w,θ
′).
10now write the individual incentive compatibility constraints as follows: for every s,
every w, and every ˆ w,
u(c(s,w),y(s,w),w) ≥ u(c(s, ˆ w),y(s, ˆ w),w). (8)
The economy’s resource constraint in (1) can be written as, for all s,
n X
k=1
fk (y(s,wk) − c(s,wk)) ≥ r(q(s)) , (9)
As indicated by the inequalities in (8), only private information on skill levels is relevant
for individual incentive compatibility. Private information on public goods preferences
plays no role. This is a striking diﬀerence to the literature on public goods provision in
“small” economies in the tradition of Clarke (1971), Groves (1973) or d’Aspremont and
G´ erard-Varet (1979). In these models, each individual announces a taste parameter
and thereby aﬀects how much of a public good is provided. In the given large economy
model, no individual has a direct inﬂuence on public good provision which implies that
individual consumption levels and output requirements can not be made dependent on
public goods preferences.
The model derived so far is a straightforward extension of the model of optimal in-
come taxation due to Mirrlees (1971).13 A diﬀerence is that the present model has
aggregate uncertainty so that the optimal policy depends on the state s of the econ-
omy. However, if the only constraints that need to be taken into account are those in
(9) and (8), this has no bearing on the set of optimal policies. Given that individuals
have no impact on public good provision, they also have no reason to hide their true
public goods preferences from the policy maker. This implies that the policy maker will
get the information on the state of the economy for “free”, i.e., without having to pro-
vide appropriate incentives for a revelation of public goods preferences. The remaining
problem is to determine the optimal tax and expenditure policy for each given state s.
This policy problem is equivalent to the one that is analyzed in the theory of optimal
income taxation.
3 Collective Incentive Compatibility
The characterization of individually incentive compatible social choice functions in the
preceding section has led to the conclusion that, in a large economy, private information
on public goods preferences plays no role. Even if there is uncertainty about the social
beneﬁts from public good provision, this uncertainty can be easily resolved because,
in a large economy, no individual has a direct inﬂuence on the quantity of the public
13Contributions to the theory of optimal income taxation often use a primal approach which relies
on a characterization of social choice functions that can be achieved by means of an income tax sys-
tem, see Stiglitz (1982), Boadway and Keen (1993), Gahvari (2006), or Hellwig (2007). This yields
implementability conditions that, for given s, coincide with the constraints in (9) and (8).
11good, and hence no individual minds revealing his public goods preference.
This view is somewhat implausible. Every democratic society knows the constant strug-
gle of political parties and all sorts of special interest groups about the desirability of
expenditure policies. Hence, in a large economy, individuals undertake collective ac-
tions in order to inﬂuence the provision of public goods. This suggests that, in addition
to individual incentive compatibility constraints which incorporate how individual be-
havior depends on policy choices, the model should also include collective incentive
compatibility constraints which take account of the possibility that individuals may lie
collectively about their preferences in order to induce policies that are more favorable
to them.
Our approach to coalition formation is as follows: A coalition is a subset of types.
Given that, with an anonymous social choice function, an individual’s expected payoﬀ
depends only on the individual’s type, this means that we take aligned preferences to
be the rationale for coalition formation.
Coalition formation is an own mechanism design problem which gives rise to its own
set of incentive problems.14 Formally, a coalition is viewed as a direct mechanism.
Individuals with types in R ⊂ T make a (possibly false) type announcement to a ﬁc-
titious coalition manager. Incentive compatibility constraints ensure that individuals
communicate their types truthfully to the coalition organizer.
Given that individuals reveal their types truthfully to the coalition organizer, the latter
can acquire partial information about the state of the world because he can observe
the population-shares of all types t in R. Given this information, the coalition orga-
nizer makes announcements on behalf of the individuals with types in R to the overall
mechanism designer. Thereby he can manipulate the policy outcome. The following
example illustrates this possibility.
3.1 An example
Suppose that there are only two possible skill levels W = {w1,w2}, i.e., individuals with
wi = w1 are low-skilled and individuals with wi = w2 are high-skilled. Also suppose
that Θ = {θ1,θ2} so that individuals with θi = θ1 have a low valuation of the public
good and individuals with θi = θ2 have a high valuation of the public good.







4; that is, s′′
k is such that among those indi-
viduals with wi = wk, many have a high valuation of the public good and s′
k is such
that many have a low valuation of the public good. Depending on the distribution of
public goods preferences among the high-skilled and low-skilled, respectively, there are
in total four possible states of the economy.
14This approach to coalition formation has been introduced by Laﬀont and Martimort (1997, 2000).
Our approach is here is more general in the sense that we not only allow for deviations by the “grand
coalition” of all agents, bot allow any subset of individuals to deviate.
12Suppose, for simplicity, that the overall mechanism is a direct mechanism.15 Consider
a coalition of low-skilled individuals. If all low-skilled individuals reveal their type to
the coalition manager the latter learns whether many or only few low-skilled individ-
uals have a high taste for the public good, i.e., he learns whether the distribution of
preferences among the low-skilled equals s′
1 or s′′
1. However, he remains ignorant with
respect to the distribution of preferences among the high-skilled.
In the following we give an example of a social choice function that can be manipulated
by such a coalition. Let
Vk(s) = u(c(s,wk),y(s,wk),wk)
be a shorthand notation for the utility that individuals with skill level wk derive from
their c−y bundle in state s = (s1,s2). The payoﬀ of a low-skilled individual with taste
parameter θ in state s can then be written as
v(q(s1,s2),θ) + V1(s1,s2).






This says that, whatever the preferences of the high-skilled, all low-skilled individuals
are better oﬀ if the mechanism designer chooses policy under the assumption that only
few low-skilled individuals have a high valuation of the public good. Such situations
can occur in models in which raising taxes for the public good is more painful for the
“poor”. Even if they have a high valuation of the public good, they prefer less public
spending because the disutility of increased taxation does not compensate for the util-
ity gain from increased public good provision.16
Now consider the following manipulation mechanism for low-skilled individuals. When-
ever the state of the world is such that s1 = s′
1 the coalition organizer reports the
characteristics of low-skilled agents truthfully to the overall mechanism. By contrast,
if s1 = s′′
1 he reports the skill-parameters truthfully but reports taste parameters in
such a way that the reported proﬁle ˆ s1 satisﬁes ˆ s1 = s′
1. This manipulation makes all
low-skilled individual better oﬀ, so that they are happy to participate. Moreover, the
coalition mechanism itself is incentive compatible. This follows because the coalition
organizer only manipulates taste parameters and individuals are indiﬀerent which taste
parameter to announce. Hence, the coalition manager makes a choice from an individ-
ual’s best response correspondence, which implies that no individual has an incentive
to lie to the coalition manager.
15Below, we prove that the Revelation Principle holds in our model, so that this assumption is
without loss of generality.
16Bierbrauer (2008a) and Bierbrauer and Sahm (2008) show that Mirrleesian models of optimal
nonlinear income taxation may give rise to this constellation.
133.2 Implementation as a coalition-proof equilibrium
A manipulation for individuals with types in R is a list of probability distributions
χR = {χ(φR,t)}t∈R with support A; i.e., χ(φR,t)[a] is the probability that an individ-
ual with type t will choose action a, if the cross-section distribution of types in R is
given by φR.
We assume that an individual’s action conditional on φR and t may be random. How-
ever, the distribution of actions that is communicated by the coalition organizer is not.
In the example in Subsection 3.1, it may be random for whom the coalition organizer
chooses to announce a low taste parameter instead of a high taste parameter. In any
case, he chooses a proﬁle of announcements such that ˆ s1 = s′
1 with probability 1.
Let a mechanism M = (A,Q,C,Y ) be given. In the following, we denote by α(φ,σ,χR)
the (non-random) distribution of actions that results if the cross-section distribution
of types is φ, individuals with types not in R follow a strategy σ and individuals with




the utility that a type t individual realizes under mechanism M from choosing action
a given that the distribution of actions is α(φ,σ,χR). If all individuals follow σ, i.e., if
there is no manipulation, then we denote the payoﬀ by ˜ U(α(φ,σ),a,w(t),θ(t)).
Given a type space T , a mechanism M, and an interim Nash equilibrium strategy σ∗,









˜ U(α(φ(T ),σ∗),σ∗(t),w(t),θ(t)) dπ(t) .
Individuals will only participate in the manipulation mechanism if this leads to a higher
expected payoﬀ relative to a situation where all individuals behave according to σ∗, so
that the participation constraint has to be satisﬁed for all types in R.
Since the coalition manager has no information about individual characteristics, the
manipulation has to be incentive compatible. This has two aspects. First, individuals
must prefer revealing their type truthfully to the coalition manger over lying to the











˜ U(α(φ(T ),σ∗,χR),a,w(t),θ(t)) dχR(φR(T ),t′) dπ(t) .
Second, individuals with types in R must prefer communicating with the coalition
organizer over communicating directly with the overall mechanism, i.e., for every t ∈ R









˜ U(α(φ(T ),σ∗,χR),a′,w(t),θ(t)) dπ(t) .
σ∗ is said to be a coalition-proof interim Nash equilibrium in the game induced by
mechanism M on type space T if it is an interim Nash equilibrium and there is no
subset of types R with a manipulation χR that is incentive compatible and satisﬁes the
participation constraint.17
A social choice function (q,c,y) is said to be implementable as a coalition-proof interim
Nash equilibrium on type space T , if there is a mechanism M and a strategy σ∗ such
that (i) for the game induced by M on type space T , σ∗ is a coalition-proof interim
Nash equilibrium, and (ii) the equilibrium allocation coincides with the prescription of
the social choice function for this type space; i.e., conditions (2)-(4) are satisﬁed.
This model of coalition formation does not consider the possibility that manipulations
may rely on side-payments; e.g., individuals who seek to change the outcome of the
mechanism may pay other individuals for modifying their messages. For the notion of
collective incentive compatibility that will be derived below in Proposition 3, this is
without loss of generality. A discussion of the argument is relegated to the Appendix,
see Section A.4.
3.3 Robust implementability
It is straightforward to add the requirement of coalition-proofness to the notion of ro-
bust implementability that was introduced in Section 2: A social choice function is said
to be robustly implementable as a coalition-proof interim Nash equilibrium if there is
a mechanism M and a strategy σ∗ such that (i) σ∗ : T → A is a coalition-proof interim
Nash equilibrium strategy for the game induced by M on every type space and (ii)
conditions (2)-(4) hold on every type space.
This solution concept of robust implementability as a coalition-proof interim Nash equi-
librium combines the ideas of Laﬀont and Martimort (1997, 2000), on the one hand, and
of Bergemann and Morris (2005), on the other. As Laﬀont and Martimort, we allow in-
dividuals to manipulate the overall allocation mechanism and, moreover, treat coalition
formation as an own mechanism design problem that faces participation and incentive
compatibility constraints.18 This yields a notion of implementability as a coalition-
17The notion of coalition-proofness by Bernheim et al. (1986) imposes one further requirement: If a
coalition R forms, this must not trigger a further deviation by a subset R
′ of R, where the latter would
again have to pass this test, and so on. With this approach, coalition-proofness does not have a lot of
bite. A mechanism designer could then use “oﬀ-the-equilibrium-rewards” to destabilize any coalition;
that is, he could promise payoﬀs to subcoalition R
′ – knowing that these payoﬀs are never realized –
to eliminate any incentive for individuals in R to deviate.
18The framework here is more general in that we allow for coalitions of any size which also implies that
the coalition formation is subject to incomplete information about the distribution of characteristics
among those individuals who do not participate.
15proof equilibrium, for a given environment, and, in particular, for a given speciﬁcation
of individual beliefs. Following Bergemann and Morris, we then add the requirement
of robust implementability, i.e., we require that implementation as a coalition-proof
equilibrium is possible for every environment and, in particular, for every cross-section
distribution of individual beliefs.
Proposition 2 below shows that the requirement of coalition-proofness changes the re-
lationship between social choice functions that are robustly implementable and those
that are implementable on every complete information type space. Without coalition-
proofness the two are equivalent as follows from Proposition 1. With coalition-proofness,
robust implementability implies implementability on every complete information type
space but not vice versa.
Proposition 2 Robust implementability of a social choice function as a coalition-proof
interim Nash equilibrium implies implementability as a coalition-proof interim Nash
equilibrium on every complete information types space. The converse implication does
not hold.
The reason that robust implementability as a coalition-proof equilibrium is more re-
strictive than implementability on every complete information type space is that, with
robust implementability, joint manipulations by individuals who have antagonistic pref-
erences may restrict the set of implementable social choice functions. The proof of the
Proposition (see the Appendix) is based on an example of a binary public good that is
either provided (q = 1) or not provided (q = 0). In this setting, a joint manipulation by
individuals who are harmed by public good provision and by individuals who beneﬁt
from public good provision can by supported if we make speciﬁc assumptions about
individual beliefs. The manipulation works as follows. Those who are harmed by public
good provision are willing to make public good provision possible in some state s′ if
they are compensated by non-provision in some other state s′′. Likewise, individuals
who beneﬁt from public good provision are willing to block public good provision in
some state if this implies that the public good will be provided in some other state.19
However, such a manipulation is not robust with the respect to the speciﬁcation of
beliefs. For instance, if all individuals put a lot of probability mass on the true state
of the economy being s′, then individuals who oppose public good provision, will not
consider the above manipulation very attractive. Likewise, if individuals assume that
the state is almost surely s′′, then individuals who beneﬁt from public good provi-
sion will not participate. Consequently, if attention is limited to complete information
environments, then coalition-proofness is a less stringent constraint because joint ma-
nipulations of types whose preferences are opposed to each other will no longer restrict
the set of implementable social choice functions.
19With a similar logic, one can construct examples such that that individuals who have the same
preferences but diﬀerent beliefs disagree over the attractiveness of a manipulation and hence fail to
coordinate.
16In the following, we will limit attention to complete information type spaces. The
requirement that a social function is implementable on each complete information type
space seems reasonable for environments where agents have accurate information about
the distribution of preferences. To give an example, suppose that a political decision
has to be taken and each party that participates in the decision-making mechanism has
a very good sense of the preferences of all other parties. However, while these prefer-
ences are known among parties, they are not veriﬁable: There is nothing that prevents
a party from communicating that it does not want a bridge to be built (e.g., in order
to limit its contributions to the cost of provision), even if all other parties know that,
in fact, the party would be better oﬀ otherwise.
In addition, the restriction to complete information type spaces has some further impli-
cations that are convenient. First, manipulations will be driven exclusively by aligned
preferences. This follows since all individuals have the same beliefs so that preferences
are the only source of heterogeneity. In particular, there is no role for manipulations
that are viable only because of speciﬁc assumptions on the beliefs of individuals. A
further advantage is tractability. This will become clear in the subsequent Section
where we study the implications or implementability for all complete information en-
vironments. Finally, given that implementability on every complete information type
space is weaker than the requirement of robust implementability, the constraints that
we derive in the following also have to be satisﬁed with the more demanding solution
concept.
The following Proposition characterizes the social choice functions that are imple-
mentable as a coalition-proof interim Nash equilibrium on every complete information
type space. In particular, it is shown that the requirement of coalition-proofness gives
rise to an additional set of constraints that we refer to as collective incentive compati-
bility constraints.
Proposition 3 The following statements are equivalent.
(a) A social choice function is implementable as a coalition-proof interim Nash equi-
librium on every complete information type space
(b) A social choice function is truthfully implementable on every complete infor-
mation type space, i.e., there is a direct mechanism such that truth-telling is
a coalition-proof interim Nash equilibrium on every complete information type
space.
(c) A social choice function is individually incentive compatible and satisﬁes the
following collective incentive compatibility constraints: for all s, for all Γ ⊂
{1,...,n} × {1,...,m} and for all ˆ s ∈ ˆ S(s,Γ), there exists (k,l) ∈ Γ such that
v(q(s),θl) + Vk(s) ≥ v(q(ˆ s),θl) + Vk(ˆ s),
17where ˆ S(s,Γ) ⊂ S contains the distributions of payoﬀ types that can be induced
if starting from s, for all types (wk,θl), with (k,l) ∈ Γ, the probability mass skl
is reallocated among payoﬀ types (w′
k,θ′
l) such that wk = w′
k.
The equivalence of statements (a) and (b) establishes that the Revelation Principle
holds in our model. If there is a mechanism that implements a social choice function
on every complete information type space, then it can also be implemented as truth-
telling equilibrium of a direct mechanism; i.e., it is without loss of generality to assume
that individuals announce a skill level and a taste parameter and that there must not
exist a complete information type space such that individuals have an incentive to ma-
nipulate their announcements.
Statement (c) provides us with a characterization of social choice functions that satisfy
this property. There must not exist a state s and a set of individuals with an incentive
to manipulate the mechanism designer’s perception of the state of the economy so that
he chooses the outcome intended for state ˆ s. According to (c) it suﬃces to exclude
manipulations which are such that individuals reveal their skills but lie about their
taste parameters.
The focus on collective lies about taste parameters arises because of the assumption that
the cross-section distribution of skill levels f is not subject to aggregate uncertainty.
Hence, any collective lie that involves an announced skill proﬁle that is incompatible
with f can be easily deterred by the mechanism designer. Given that deviating in-
dividuals must act in accordance with a predetermined marginal distribution of skill
levels, it is without loss of generality to assume that collective lies involve only taste
parameters.
Moreover, given that only taste parameters are manipulated, the incentive compati-
bility constraints that a manipulation faces are trivially satisﬁed. The social choice
function treats individuals who diﬀer only in their public goods preferences equally so
that the announcement of a false taste parameter is a best response from every individ-
ual’s perspective. The only constraint that a manipulation mechanism faces is therefore
the participation constraint: there must not exist a set of individuals who can beneﬁt
from a joint lie about their taste parameters.
The characterization of individual incentive compatibility in Proposition 1 and of collec-
tive incentive compatibility in Proposition 3 can be summarized as follows: Individual
incentive compatibility refers only to private information about skill levels. Given a
decision on public policy, individuals will adjust their behavior to the environment they
are facing, i.e., they choose how much to work and how much to consume. Their assess-
ment of the consumption-leisure tradeoﬀ depends only on the skill level. This explains
why public goods preferences are irrelevant for individual incentive compatibility.
Collective incentive compatibility addresses only the communication of public goods
preferences. Given that the mechanism designer faces uncertainty only about the so-
cial beneﬁt from public good provision, but not on the cross-section distribution of skill
levels he needs to provide incentives for a collective revelation of preferences but not
18for a collective revelation of productive abilities.
4 Implications of collective incentive compatibility
In this section, we study implications of the requirement that a social choice function
must be collectively incentive compatible. In particular, we focus on a speciﬁc set
of manipulations which are such that all participating individuals have the same skill
level, but possibly diﬀerent preferences for the public good. Our main goal is to ﬁnd
conditions such that the set of collective incentive compatibility constraints that are
generated by these manipulations can be “aggregated” in the sense that they admit
a representation as a single representative individual’s incentive constraint. As will
become clear, such a characterization makes it possible to relate the collective incentive
conditions in this paper very easily to the incentive conditions which ensure a revelation
of preferences in the ﬁnite economy models that were studied by Clarke (1971), Groves
(1973) and their successors.
To exclude manipulations by individuals who have the same skills we focus on the
following subset of the collective incentive compatibility constraints that were derived
in Proposition 3. For all s = (s1,...,sn), for all k ∈ {1,...,n}, for all Γk ⊂ {1,...,m},
and for all ˆ sk ∈ ˆ Sk(sk,Γk), there exists l ∈ Γk such that
v(q(sk,s−k),θl) + Vk(sk,s−k) ≥ v(q(ˆ sk,s−k),θl) + Vk(ˆ sk,s−k), (14)
where ˆ Sk(sk,Γk) ⊂ Sk contains the distributions of payoﬀ types among individuals
with wi = wk that can be induced if starting from sk, for all taste parameters θl, with





We impose the following assumptions. For each skill level wk, the set Sk contains m ele-
ments that are ordered according to ﬁrst order stochastic dominance; Sk = {s1
k,...,sm
k }
where, for any l, sl+1
k ﬁrst order stochastically dominates sl
k. Moreover, as one moves
from sl
k to sl+1
k the mass of all taste parameters other than θl and θl+1 is unaﬀected;
i.e., the number of individuals with taste parameter θl+1 is increased at the expense of
the number of individuals with taste parameter θl. These assumptions are imposed in
the following without further mention.
Proposition 4 A social choice function satisﬁes the constraints in (14) if and only for




k ,s−k),θl) + Vk(sl+1





k ,s−k),θl) + Vk(sl−1
k ,s−k) . (16)
Condition (15) is a local upward incentive compatibility constraint for individuals with
skill level wk and taste parameter θl. If sk = sl
k then a subset of these individuals could
19collectively declare a taste parameter equal to θl+1 so that the distribution of prefer-
ences that is communicated to the mechanism designer equals ˆ sk = sl+1
k . The incentive
constraint (15) ensures that this is not attractive for these individuals. Similarly, (16) is
a local downward incentive compatibility constraint that ensures that these individuals
do not understate their preferences. The Proposition shows that these local incentive
constraints are suﬃcient to ensure that the constraints in (14) are satisﬁed. Hence, if
a local deviation violates the participation constraint for individuals with θl, then the
same is true for any deviation.20
The incentive conditions in (16) and (15) can be interpreted as referring to a “repre-
sentative agent” in the following sense: Consider a special version of the above model,
so that sk = s1
k indicates that all individuals with wi = wk have a taste parameter
equal to θ1, sk = s2
k indicates that all individuals with wi = wk have a taste parameter
equal to θ2, etc.. Hence, in every state of the economy, all individuals with the same
skill level also have the same taste parameter. Now assume that in order to determine
sk the policy maker asks a randomly chosen individual with skill level wk to make an
announcement about the own taste parameter. This again gives rise to the incentive
conditions (16) and (15). These constraints can therefore be interpreted as standard
dominant strategy incentive compatibility constraints in a ﬁnite model with n repre-
sentative agents, one for each skill level, who make an announcement about their own
taste parameter.
4.1 Groves mechanisms
We now discuss the possibility to implement a surplus-maximizing provision rule for
the public good subject to the collective incentive compatibility constraints in (16) and
(15). The focus on surplus maximization drives the analysis of Clarke-Groves mecha-
nisms in ﬁnite economy models. We show below that this analysis can be replicated in
this paper’s large economy model. Hence, the combination of the individual incentive
compatibility constraints in Proposition 1 and the collective incentive compatibility
constraints in Proposition 4 is indeed a synthesis of Mirrleesian income taxation and
incentives for a revelation of preferences in the sense of Clarke and Groves.
The collective incentive conditions in (16) and (15) are only a subset of all collective
incentive compatibility constraints. In particular, the possibility of joint manipulations
by individuals of diﬀerent abilities is left open. However, given that the constraints in
Proposition 4 have the same structure as the well-understood dominant strategy indi-
vidual incentive compatibility conditions in models with ﬁnitely many agents, ignor-
ing collective incentive compatibility constraints that involve a coordination of several
representative agents is as good or as bad as the focus on individual incentive compat-
ibility in ﬁnite economy models. For instance, Cr´ emer (1996) has shown that Groves
mechanisms are generally manipulable by coalitions of several agents, even if coalition
20This follows from standard arguments which exploit the assumption that the marginal utility from
public good provision vq increases in the taste parameter. See the Appendix.
20formation itself is subject to incentive compatibility conditions.







skl v(x,θl) − r(x)
The construction of a Groves mechanism is based on the observations that a surplus

































A Groves mechanism is based on the idea to choose Vk such that two maximization



























and (ii) that the right-hand side of (19) is independent of sl
k, the true distribution of
preferences among individuals with skill level wk.
Generally, it will not be possible to achieve (i) and (ii) simultaneously. However, if
we impose the assumptions that skills are uniformly distributed (fk = 1
n, for each
k) and that there is no heterogeneity in public goods preferences among individuals
with the same taste parameter (for each k, s1
k = (1,0,...,0), s2
k = (0,1,0,... ,0), ...,
sm
k = (0,...,0,1)) we have a model that is mathematically identical to a ﬁnite economy
model. Not surprisingly, this implies that a Groves mechanisms works.
To see this, note ﬁrst that (17) can now be written as follows: for every k, for every

















where θ(sg) is the taste parameter of individuals with wi = wg in state s. If we now











which is just the standard deﬁnition of a Groves mechanism. The following Proposition
summarizes these results.
21Proposition 5 If skills are uniformly distributed and every state s is such that wi =
wj implies θi = θj for every pair of individuals i and j, then a Groves mechanism
implements the surplus maximizing provision rule q∗ subject to the collective incentive
compatibility constraints (16) and (15).
The Proposition shows that a Groves mechanism can elicit information on public goods
preferences and implement the surplus maximizing decision on public good provision.
As is well known from the analysis of Groves mechanisms in ﬁnite economies, budget
balance is typically not possible.21 In the model of this paper there is an additional
concern, namely whether consumption levels and output requirements can be chosen
such that individual incentive compatibility holds. In the following, we discuss the
implications of collective incentive compatibility constraints for the analysis of tax
systems which, traditionally, has been concerned with government budget constraints
and incentive constraints at the individual level.
4.2 Implications for the analysis of income tax systems
Collective incentive compatibility imposes constraints on the joint analysis of public
goods provision and taxation. We now derive two necessary conditions which describe
how taxes of individuals have to vary with the state s of the economy. If these conditions
are violated public policy will be manipulated.
By (15) and (16), collective incentive compatibility holds if and only if for all k, for all
s−k and for all l < m,
vq(q(sl+1
k ,s−k),θl+1) − vq(q(sl
k,s−k),θl+1) ≥ Vk(sl
k,s−k) − Vk(sl+1




k ,s−k) ≥ vq(q(sl+1
k ,s−k),θl) − vq(q(sl
k,s−k),θl) . (23)
According to (22), the drop in the utility from private goods Vk as one moves from
sl
k to sl+1
k must be bounded from above so that individuals with taste parameter θl+1
are willing to accept this utility loss in exchange for the utility gain that is due to
increased public good provision. If this condition was violated then individuals with
taste parameter θl+1 would understate their preferences for the public good.
According to (23), the drop in the utility from private goods must be bounded from
below. If this property was violated then the cost of increased public good provision
that is born by individuals with taste parameter θl is so small that these individuals
would exaggerate their public goods preferences.
Adding these inequalities and using the assumption that the marginal utility from public
good provision increases in the taste parameter reveals that q(sl
k,s−k) ≤ q(sl+1
k ,s−k),
i.e., if there are ceteris paribus more individuals with a high taste parameter among
21Green and Laﬀont (1977) show that this is generally true for any mechanism with a dominant
strategy equilibrium that achieves surplus maximization.
22those with skill level wk, this increases the amount of the public good that is provided.
Using (23) this implies that Vk(sl
k,s−k) ≥ Vk(sl+1
k ,s−k), if more of the public good
is provided this must imply that individuals with skills wk pay more taxes and hence
derive a lower utility from private goods. Moreover, (22) and (23) imply that
q(sl
k,s−k) = q(sl+1





k ,s−k) =⇒ Vk(sl
k,s−k) = Vk(sl+1
k ,s−k) can be inter-
preted as “no taxation without representation”, i.e., if a larger willingness to pay for
the public good among individuals with skills wk is not reﬂected by the provision rule
q, then it is not possible to tax these individuals more heavily. They would never admit
a higher valuation of the public good if the only consequence was that they have to pay
more taxes. The converse implication reads as “no representation without taxation.” If
individuals do not pay more taxes as their valuation of the public good goes up, then
the provision rule for the public good cannot incorporate this change in preferences.
Otherwise, individuals would always exaggerate their preferences for the public good
since they do not have to pay for it.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has derived two sets of incentive conditions for public policy. Individ-
ual incentive compatibility takes into account how individuals respond to an income
tax system that determines their after-tax income as a function of their labor supply.
Collective incentive compatibility incorporates that individuals may lobby for certain
expenditure policies and thus addresses the political reactions that may be triggered
by the policy mechanism.
The analysis has led to a set of necessary conditions that are implied by the require-
ment of collective incentive compatibility. If a group of individuals experiences a shift
in their public goods preferences such that their willingness to pay for a public good
is increased, then it must be true that more of the public good is provided (otherwise
these individuals understate their public goods preferences) and that these individuals
pay more taxes (otherwise they exaggerate their preferences). More generally speaking,
the tax system confronts individuals with prices for public goods. Collective incentive
compatibility requires that these prices are set in an “appropriate” manner, namely in
such a way that the demand for public goods can be determined.
The present paper has illustrated this logic within the model that is used in the the-
ory of optimal income taxation. However, the same kind of reasoning applies to any
model of taxation. To illustrate this, imagine a model of capital taxation in the sense
of Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985b). Suppose that this economy converges to a sta-
tionary state in which the distribution of public goods preferences is random in each
period. Obviously, if individuals who have only capital income never pay taxes in
such a long-run equilibrium, then the arguments of this paper imply that it becomes
impossible to reﬂect their preferences when choosing the level of public expenditures.
23Alternatively, if their preferences are to be considered, then people with capital income
will have to pay taxes at least in those circumstances where they value the public good
rather highly.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The Revelation Principle implies that a social choice function (q,c,y) is implementable as an
interim Nash equilibrium by some mechanism M on a given type space T if and only if it is
truthfully implementable, i.e., if and only if their exists a direct mechanism M′ with an action set
A′ = T and outcome functions Q′ : φ  → Q′(φ), C′ : (φ,t)  → C′(φ,t), and Y ′ : (φ,t)  → Y ′(φ,t)




U(Q′(φ(T )),C′(φ(T ),t′),Y ′(φ(T ),t′),w(t),θ(t)) dπ(t) ; (24)
and (ii) the equilibrium allocation is equal to the social choice function,
Q′(φ(T )) = q(s(T )) (25)
and, for every t,
C′(φ(T ),t) = c(s(T ),w(t),θ(t)) and Y ′(φ(T ),t) = y(s(T ),w(t),θ(t)) . (26)
We will show that a social choice function is individually incentive compatible if and only if it
is truthfully implementable as an interim Nash equilibrium on every extended type space T .
“⇐=”: Given an incentive compatible social choice function (q,c,y) and given an extended
types space T , construct a direct mechanism (T,Q′,C′,Y ′) such that (25) and (26) hold. We
seek to verify that, for every t,
t ∈ argmaxt′∈T
R
∆T U(Q′(φ(T )),C′(φ(T ),t′),Y ′(φ(T ),t′),w(t),θ(t)) dπ(t)
= argmaxt′∈T
P
s ˆ π(t)[s] U(q(s),c(s,w(t′),θ(t′)),y(s,w(t′),θ(t′)),w(t),θ(t)) ,
where ˆ π(t)[s] :=
R
{φ∈∆T|φ1=s} dπ(t), and φ1 denotes the marginal cross-section distribution of
payoﬀ types associated with φ. Equivalently, for every t,
(w(t),θ(t)) ∈ argmax(w′,θ′)∈W×Θ
P
s ˆ π(t)[s] U(q(s),c(s,w′,θ′),y(s,w′,θ′),w(t),θ(t)) .
This follows from the fact that (q,c,y) is incentive compatible.
“=⇒”: If (q,c,y) is truthfully implementable as an interim Nash equilibrium on every extended
type space, then (q,c,y) is, in particular, truthfully implementable on every complete informa-
tion type space; i.e., on every type space T which is such that, for all t, ˆ π(t)[s] = 1, for some
26given s. If a direct mechanism (T,Q′,C′,Y ′) truthfully implements (q,c,y) on such a type
space then it must be true that (25) and (26) hold for this type space. Using these conditions
to substitute for Q′, C′, and Y ′, the equilibrium conditions in (24) becomes: for all t and all t′,
U(q(s),c(s,w(t),θ(t)),y(s,w(t),θ(t)),w(t),θ(t)) ≥
U(q(s),c(s,w(t′),θ(t′)),y(s,w(t′),θ(t′)),w(t),θ(t)) ;
or, equivalently, for all (w,θ) and (w′,θ′),
U(q(s),c(s,w,θ),y(s,w,θ),w,θ) ≥ U(q(s),c(s,w′,θ′),y(s,w′,θ′),w,θ) .
Since the choice of s was arbitrary, the latter inequality holds for all s. Hence, (q,c,y) is
individually incentive compatible.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Robust implementability as a coalition-proof interim Nash equilibrium implies, be deﬁnition,
implementability on every complete information type space. It hence remains to be shown
that implementability on every complete information type space does not imply robust imple-
mentability. This is proven by means of an example.
Suppose that there are two possible skill levels, W = {w1,w2} and three possible taste param-
eters, Θ = {θ1,θ2,θ3}. Suppose that S = {s′, ¯ s′,s′′, ¯ s′′}, where
i) s′ is such that all low-skilled individuals have a low taste parameter, s′
11 = 1, and all
high-skilled individuals have taste parameter θ2, s′
22 = 1. ¯ s′ is such that all low-skilled
individuals have a low taste parameter, s′
13 = 1, and all high-skilled individuals have
taste parameter θ2, ¯ s′
22 = 1.
ii) s′′ is such that all low-skilled individuals have taste parameter θ2, s′′
12 = 1, and all high-
skilled individuals have a high taste parameter, s′′
23 = 1. ¯ s′′ is such that all low-skilled
individuals have taste parameter θ2, ¯ s′′
12 = 1, and all high-skilled individuals have a low
taste parameter, ¯ s′′
21 = 1.
Let (q,c,y) be an individually incentive compatible social choice function, which implies that a
direct mechanism can implement (q,c,y) as a truthful interim Nash equilibrium on every type
space.
We introduce the following notation for the payoﬀs induced by the social choice function. In
state s′ the payoﬀ of low-skilled individuals with a low taste parameter is x′
11, i.e.
v(q(s′),θ1) + V1(s′) = x′
11.
A low-skilled individual with a high taste parameter would derive utility
v(q(s′),θ3) + V1(s′) = x′
13.
from the outcome prescribed by the social choice function for state s′. Likewise, we denote the
payoﬀ of high-skilled individuals with taste parameter θ2 by x′




22 in the same way. The analog deﬁnitions apply for states s′′ and ¯ s′′.
Suppose the payoﬀs induced by the social choice function are as follows:
i) x′
11 = ¯ x11 +ǫ, i.e., low-skilled individuals with a low taste parameter prefer the outcome
for state s′ over the outcome for state ¯ s′. x′
22 = ¯ x′
22 − 2ǫ so that high-skilled individuals
prefer the outcome for state ¯ s′ over the outcome for state s′.
27ii) Analogously, x′′
23 = ¯ x′′
23 + ǫ and x′′
























Step 1. We will now verify that this social choice function can be implemented as a coalition-
proof interim Nash equilibrium on every complete information type space. Consider a direct
mechanism which achieves the social choice function, i.e., which is such that for all s ∈ S and
for all of the corresponding complete information type spaces, conditions (2)-(4) are satisﬁed.
We show that truth-telling is coalition-proof on every complete information type space.
Construct the direct mechanism such that, whenever the cross-section distribution of type an-
nouncements is incompatible with any of the four complete information type spaces, then all
individuals receive a very low payoﬀ. This deters any manipulation that leads away from the
set of outcomes prescribed by the social choice function. This implies, in particular, that we
can assume that all individuals reveal their skill levels truthfully. Given the assumption that
there is a commonly known distribution f of skill levels, a collective manipulation of skill levels
yields a bad payoﬀ and does not satisfy the participation constraints. Also, given any distri-
bution of announcements that is consistent with a complete information type space for one of
the possible states in S, due to individual incentive compatibility, revealing one’s skill level is
a best response. Hence, in the following we limit attention to manipulations that involve only
lies about taste parameters.
Consider state s′ and a corresponding complete information type space. A coalition that con-
sists only of high-skilled has no manipulation that satisﬁes the participation constraint. Given
that low-skilled individuals reveal their characteristics, any such manipulation leads away from
the outcomes prescribed by the social choice function. Given that high-skilled individuals reveal
their characteristics truthfully, a coalition that consists only of low-skilled individuals could in-
duce the outcome for state ¯ s′. Since x′
11 = ¯ x′
11 + ǫ this is incompatible with the participation
constraint. A manipulation by high-skilled and low-skilled individuals can induce the outcome





11} none of these manipula-
tions satisﬁes the participation constraint for low-skilled individuals.
A similar argument can be made for any alternative state s ∈ S. Hence, the social choice
function is implementable as a coalition-proof equilibrium on every complete information type
space.
Step 2. We will now show that the social choice function (q,c,y) speciﬁed above is not im-
plementable on a type space T ′ such that the cross-section distribution of payoﬀs is given by
s(T ′) = s′ and the beliefs of all individuals assign probability 1
2 to the state of the economy
being s′ and also probability 1
2 to the state being s′′.
Suppose to the contrary that there is a mechanism M = (A,Q,C,Y ) and a strategy σ∗ that
implement (q,c,y) on each complete information type space and on T ′. Consider a manipula-
tion by the grand coalition of all agents. Given that the manipulation is incentive compatible,
this implies that the coalition organizer will learn the true state s of the economy. Now suppose
that the coalition organizer chooses the actions for the overall mechanism in the following way:
i) In states ¯ s′ and ¯ s′′ the outcome remains unmanipulated, i.e., for an individual that has
announced type t, the coalition organizer’s choice is σ∗(t).
ii) In state s′ the coalition organizer chooses for each t with (w(t),θ(t)) = (w1,θ1), an action
σ∗(t′) where t′ is such that (w(t′),θ(t′)) = (w1,θ3). For each t with (w(t),θ(t)) = (w2,θ2)
he chooses the action σ∗(t).
28iii) In state s′′ the coalition organizer chooses for each t with (w(t),θ(t)) = (w2,θ3), an action
σ∗(t′) where t′ is such that (w(t′),θ(t′)) = (w2,θ1). For each t with (w(t),θ(t)) = (w1,θ2)
he chooses the action σ∗(t).
We now verify that this manipulation satisﬁes the participation constraint and the incentive
compatibility constraint on type space T ′. This is a contradiction of the hypothesis that (q,c,y)
is implementable as a coalition-proof interim Nash equilibrium on type space T ′.
To see that this manipulation is incentive compatible, note that under the manipulation in-
dividuals expect that the distribution of actions is with probability 1
2 as if the true state was
¯ s′ and all individuals followed σ∗ and with probability 1
2 as if the true state was ¯ s′′ and all
individuals followed σ∗.
In either case, individuals get the same utility that they would get if they followed σ∗, taking
the manipulated distribution of actions as given. This follows since, by assumption, M im-
plements (q,c,y) on every complete information type space (equations (2)-(4) hold for every
complete information types space with s(T ) ∈ S), individuals who diﬀer only in their public
goods preferences get the same utility from their (c,y) bundle (equation (7)) and the manip-
ulation is constructed such that an individual of type t always chooses an action σ∗(t) that is
chosen by a type t′ such that w(t) = w(t′). Hence, the manipulation is such that an individual’s
manipulated action is a best response. This implies incentive compatibility of the manipulation.
The participation constraint is satisﬁed because each individual loses ǫ with probability 1
2 and
gains 2ǫ with probability 1
2. Hence the expected utility gain from the manipulation is 1
2ǫ > 0
for each individual.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Step 1. We ﬁrst establish the equivalence of statements (a) and (b). Obviously, (b) implies (a).
Hence it remains to be shown that if a social function is implementable by some mechanism
on every complete information type space, then it is also truthfully implementable on every
complete information type space.
We limit attention to social choice functions that are individually incentive compatible.22 Sup-
pose (q,c,y) is individually incentive compatible and suppose that there is a complete informa-
tion type space T ′ with a cross-section distribution of payoﬀ types equal to s′ such that (q,c,y)
is not implementable as a truthful coalition-proof interim Nash equilibrium. Suppose without
loss of generality that the direct mechanism deters any manipulation that is incompatible with
the set S. Formally, let φ be a typical cross-section distribution of types and φ1 the corre-
sponding marginal distribution of payoﬀ types. We assume that distribution of types ˆ φ that is
communicated to the mechanism designer is such that ˆ φ1 ∈ S.23
This implies in particular that we may assume that for all individuals who participate in a
manipulation the skill levels are communicated truthfully to the overall mechanism, i.e., if t is
an individual’s true type then the type ˆ t communicated to the overall mechanism is such that
w(t) = w(ˆ t) with probability 1.
To see that this is without loss of generality, note that since all individuals on a complete
22Due to Proposition 1 if this property fails then a social choice function is not implementable by
any mechanism. Also, as follows from the arguments in the proof of Proposition 1 if a social choice
function is individually incentive compatible, then it is truthfully implementable as an interim Nash
equilibrium on every complete information type spaces.
23If the failure of collective incentive compatibility was only due to a manipulation that induces an
“oﬀ-the-equilibrium-outcome” then there is a direct mechanism that makes this outcome suﬃciently
unattractive and which implements the social choice function as a coalition-proof equilibrium.
29information type space have the same beliefs we may represent the subset of types R who par-
ticipate in a manipulation by a subset of skill levels and taste parameters WR × ΘR ⊂ W × Θ
so that t ∈ R if and only if (w(t),θ(t)) ∈ WR × ΘR. The assumptions that the manipulation
induces a distribution of announcements with ˆ φ1 ∈ S and that each s ∈ S gives rise to the
same marginal cross-section distribution f of skill levels,24 imply that any eﬀect that a false
communication of payoﬀ types for individuals with payoﬀ types in WR × ΘR may have on ˆ φ1
can also be induced if all skill levels are communicated truthfully and only taste parameters
are manipulated.25 Moreover, if only taste parameters are manipulated this implies that the
manipulation is incentive compatible. This follows since individual incentive compatibility of
the social choice function implies that individuals are willing to announce any taste parameter.
Consequently, a manipulation is viable if and only if ist satisﬁes the participation constraint.
By hypothesis (q,c,y) is not implementable as a coalition-proof interim Nash equilibrium on
T ′. Hence there exists R and a manipulation χR such that for all t ∈ R,
U(q(ˆ φ1),c(ˆ φ1,w(t)),y(ˆ φ1,w(t)),w(t),θ(t)) (27)
> U(q(s′),c(s′,w(t)),y(s′,w(t)),w(t),θ(t)), (28)
where ˆ φ1 ∈ S is the manipulated cross-section distribution of payoﬀ types.
We show now that this implies that any mechanism that implements (q,c,y) both on a complete
information type space with payoﬀ type distribution s′ and on complete information type space
with payoﬀ type distribution ˆ φ1 is not coalition-proof.
Let M be a (non-direct) mechanism with an equilibrium strategy σ∗ that implements (q,c,y) on
the given complete information type space and on a complete information type space T ′′ such
that the cross-section distribution of payoﬀ types equals ˆ φ1, s(T ′′) = ˆ φ1. Now consider type
space T ′ and consider a manipulation χ′
R which is deﬁned with reference to the manipulation
χR above: both manipulations have the same set of participating types R, and χ′
R is constructed
such that χR(φR,t)[t′] = χ′
R(φR,t)[σ∗(t′)] for all φR, all t ∈ R and all t′ ∈ T.
Given that M = (A,Q,C,Y ) implements the social choice function on T ′ and on T ′′ it must
be true that for each T ∈ {T ′,T ′′},
Q(α(φ(T ),σ∗)) = q(s(T )) (29)
and, for all t,
C(α(φ(T ),σ∗),σ∗(t)) = c(s(T ),w(t),θ(t)) (30)
and
Y (α(φ(T ),σ∗),σ∗(t)) = y(s(T ),w(t),θ(t)) . (31)
Hence the payoﬀ consequence from announcing some type t ∈ R to the coalition organizer is the
same under M and under the direct mechanism. Also, the payoﬀ consequence of announcing
t to the overall mechanism designer is the same as the payoﬀ consequence of choosing action
σ∗(t) under the non-direct mechanism. This implies, in particular, that the manipulation χ′
R
is incentive compatible and satisﬁes the participation constraint.
24For each s ∈ S, and each k ∈ {1,...,n},
Pm
l=1 skl = fk.
25More formally: Given a state s and given that every individual with a payoﬀ type (wk,θl) that
does not belong to WR × ΘR reports truthfully, any ˆ φ
1 that the coalition organizer can induce if he
only faces the constraint ˆ φ
1 ∈ S when choosing announcements for individuals with payoﬀ types in
WR × ΘR can also be induced if the additional constraint, for all t ∈ R the announcement ˆ t has to be
such that w(ˆ t) = w(t), is imposed.
30Step 2. We ﬁrst show that (b) implies (c). Suppose that (q,c,y) is individually incentive
compatible and suppose that there is a complete information type space T ′ with a cross-section
distribution of payoﬀ types equal to s′ such that (q,c,y) is not implementable as a truthful
coalition-proof interim Nash equilibrium. We will show that this implies a violation of the
collective incentive compatibility constraints.
Following the arguments in Step 1, we may assume t ∈ R if and only if (w(t),θ(t)) ∈ WR ×
ΘR and that skill levels are communicated truthfully and the inequality in (27) holds. This
inequality may be equivalently stated as follows: There exists a subset ΓR of {1,...,n} ×
{1,...,m} such that (k,l) ∈ ΓR implies that
v(q(ˆ φ




for some ˆ φ1 ∈ S, where ˆ φ1 belongs to the distribution of payoﬀ types that can be induced if
starting from s′, for all types (wk,θl), (k,l) ∈ ΓR, the probability mass s′
kl is reallocated among
types (w′
k,θ′
l) such that wk = w′
k. This contradicts collective incentive compatibility.
We now show that (c) implies (b). Suppose that a social choice function is not collectively
incentive compatible so that there is a state s and a set Γ and state ˆ s ∈ ˆ S(s,Γ) such that for
all (k,l) ∈ Γ,
v(q(s),θl) + Vk(s) < v(q(ˆ s),θl) + Vk(ˆ s) (32)
Now consider a direct mechanism that implements (q,c,y) in a truthful interim Nash equilibrium
on a complete information type space such that the distribution of payoﬀ types is s and on a
complete information type space such that the distribution of payoﬀ types is ˆ s.
On the former type space, coalition-proofness fails: A manipulation for all types with payoﬀ
types (wk,θl) ∈ Γ which involves only false announcements of taste parameters is incentive
compatible provided the induced distribution of payoﬀ types belongs to S. This follows from
the facts that (q,c,y) is individually incentive compatible and that individuals who diﬀer only in
their taste parameters receive the same (c,y)-bundle. By construction, there is a manipulation
for individuals with types in Γ that can induce the outcome ˆ s. By (32) this makes all of them
better oﬀ, so that the participation constraint is also satisﬁed.
A.4 Side payments and Collective Incentive Compatibility
In this section we show that the notion of collective incentive compatibility that was derived in
Proposition 3 does not rely on the assumption that coalition formation must not be facilitated
by the use of side payments. We proceed in two steps. We ﬁrst ﬁx an arbitrary type space and
deﬁne implementability of a social choice function as a “coalition-proof equilibrium interim Nash
equilibrium with side payments” on this type space. Second, we require that implementation is
possible on every complete information type space and derive a notion of “collective incentive
compatibility with side payments”. In particular, it will become clear that “collective incentive
compatibility with side payments” is the same as “collective incentive compatibility without
side payments.”
We now consider the possibility that individuals make a (possibly negative) payment to the
coalition organizer. An individual’s payment to the coalition organizer reduces his after tax
income, or, equivalently, his private goods consumption. The coalition organizer is not a source
of funds, so that the aggregatepayment has to be non-negative. However, the coalition organizer
may redistribute side payments among diﬀerent types of individuals.
Given a mechanism M = (A,Q,C,Y ), a manipulation with side payments for individuals with
types in R is a list of probability distributions χR = {χR(φR,t)}t∈R with support A as in
31Section 3.2, and in addition a payment scheme ρR = {ρR(φR,t)}t∈R where ρR(φR,t) is the side
payment of an individual who has announced type t to the coalition manager.
We denote by
˜ U(α(φ,σ,χR),a,p,w(t),θ(t))
:= U(Q((α(φ,σ,χR)),C(α(φ,σ,χR)),a) − p,Y (α(φ,σ,χR),a),w(t),θ(t))
the utility that a type t individual realizes under mechanism M from choosing action a and
delivering side payment p given that the distribution of actions is α(φ,σ,χR).
Given a type space T a mechanism M and an interim Nash equilibrium strategy σ∗, we say









˜ U(α(φ(T ),σ∗),σ∗(t),w(t),θ(t)) dπ(t) .
Also, a manipulation has to satisfy the following incentive compatibility constraints. First, for











˜ U(α(φ(T ),σ,χR),a,ρR(φR(T ),t′),w(t),θ(t)) dχR(φR(T ),t′) dπ(t) .









˜ U(α(φ(T ),σ,χR),a′,w(t),θ(t)) dπ(t) .




φR(φR(T ),t)dφR(T ) ≥ 0 . (36)
σ∗ is said to be a coalition-proof interim Nash equilibrium with side payments in the game
induced by mechanism M on type space T if it is an interim Nash equilibrium and there is
no subset of types R with a manipulation (χR,ρR) that is incentive compatible, budgetary
feasible and satisﬁes the participation constraint. We are interested in characterizing the social
choice functions that can be implemented as a coalition-proof interim Nash equilibrium with
side payments on every complete information type space.
For notational ease we limit attention to direct mechanisms and to truthful equilibria. Let
(q,c,y) be an individually incentive compatible social choice function, so that, by Proposition
1, (q,c,y) can be truthfully implemented as an interim Nash equilibrium on each complete
information type space.
We now show the following: any manipulation that is incentive compatible, budgetary feasible
and satisﬁes the participation constraint on some complete information type space has zero side
payments.
To see this, consider a complete information type space T with a cross-section distribution of
preferences equal to s. Suppose there is manipulation for types in R that induces the outcome
intended for some other complete information type space T ′ with distribution s′. By (35), (34)
32and the fact that (q,c,y) is individually incentive compatible, manipulating individuals must
get at least the payoﬀ that they would get from announcing their types truthfully to the overall
mechanism, taking as given that the distribution of announcements indicates that the state of
the economy is s′: for all t ∈ R,
Z
T
{v(q(s′),θ(t)) + u(c(s′,w(t′)) − ρR( ,t),y(s′,w(t′)),w(t))}dχR( ,t) (37)
≥ v(q(s′),θ(t)) + u(c(s′,w(t)),y(s′,w(t)),w(t)),
where t′ is the type announced by the coalition organizer to the overall mechanism on behalf of




{u(c(s′,w(t′)) − ρR( ,t),y(s′,w(t′)),w(t))}dχR( ,t) (38)
≥ u(c(s′,w(t)),y(s′,w(t)),w(t)),
This inequality holds only if there exists t′ such that
u(c(s′,w(t′)) − ρR( ,t),y(s′,w(t′)),w(t)) ≥ u(c(s′,w(t)),y(s′,w(t)),w(t)) (39)








Combining (40) and (39) yields ρR( ,t) ≤ 0. This implies that all individuals who participate
in the manipulation make non-negative side payments. Combining this with the manipulation’s
resource constraint implies that for (almost) all deviating types side payments have to be equal
to zero.
The interpretation of this observation is straightforward. In principle, allowing for side pay-
ments extends the set of manipulations that are potentially viable. However, in a large economy,
no individual is pivotal for the success of a manipulation which aﬀects the cross-section distribu-
tion of announcements to the overall mechanism. Individuals can therefore enjoy the outcome
of a manipulation without contributing any positive side payment. Consequently, individuals
will participate only if this involves no personal cost. This implies that side payments can not
be used.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
The constraints in (14) trivially imply that the inequalities (16) and (15) hold. For instance,
if (15) was violated and the true state of the economy was s = (sl
k,s−k), individuals whose
taste parameter equals θl would collectively lie about their taste parameters and induce an
announced distribution ˆ sk = s
l+1
k .
We now want to show that the inequalities (16) and (15) imply that the constraints in (14) are
satisﬁed. First note that for given k, s−k and l, adding the inequalities (15) and (16), where
the latter is formulated for l + 1 instead of l, yields
v(q(s
l+1




k ,s−k),θl) − v(q(s
l
k,s−k),θl)




k ,s−k),θl+1 ≥ q(sl
k,s−k) . (41)
33Second, suppose that the true state of the economy is (sl
k,s−k). Then any manipulation of
individuals with wi = wk requires the participation of those with θi = θl. If those individuals
do not participate and reveal their characteristics truthfully, any alternative manipulation in
state (sl
k,s−k) would induce a result that is incompatible with Sk.
Third, the inequalities (16) and (15) exclude that individuals with θi = θl participate in a
“local deviation”, i.e., a manipulation that induces the outcome for state (s
l+1
k ,s−k) or state
(s
l−1
k ,s−k). It remains to be shown that these individuals do also refuse participation for any
other manipulation.
Consider a manipulation that attempts to induce the outcome for state (s
l+j
k ,s−k) for some





k ,s−k),θl) + Vk(s
l+j
k ,s−k) . (42)
The monotonicity of q, (see the inequality in (41)) and the assumption vq(q,θ) is increasing in
θ, have the following implication: The local incentive constraint
v(q(s
l+j−1
k ,s−k),θl+j−1) + Vk(s
l+j−1
k ,s−k) ≥ v(q(s
l+j
k ,s−k),θl+j−i) + Vk(s
l+j
k ,s−k) .
implies that for all g ≤ l + j − 1,
v(q(s
l+j−1
k ,s−k),θg) + Vk(s
l+j−1
k ,s−k) ≥ v(q(s
l+j
k ,s−k),θg) + Vk(s
l+j
k ,s−k) .





















k ,s−k),θl) + Vk(s
l−j
k ,s−k) ,
for all j > 1.
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